



RESEARCH REPORT
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Research on social capital in Poland and Hungary

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

5

1 Introduction: social capital as a remedy for illiberalism

8

2 What is social capital, and how is it understood?

10

3 Methodology

- 3.1 The objectives of the study 11
 - 3.2 Research methods and techniques 12
 - 3.3 The structure of the sample 13
 - 3.4 The research process and schedule 14
-

16

4 Analysis of survey results

- 4.1 Trust 16
- 4.2 Norms and values 20
- 4.3 Structures 24
- 4.4 Actions 27

30

5 Summary

35

6 Appendix

- 6.1 List of Tables 35
- 6.2 List of Figures 35
- 6.3 Authors 36
- 6.4 Publishers 36

1

INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A REMEDY FOR ILLIBERALISM

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During heated political debates, people rarely reflect on the social background of issues or the political opportunities in general. Already before social media, the tabloidization of news generated the personalisation of politics. Politicians became a product; their personal life and image – bearers of political identity. Social media amplified this tendency, as the content created by politicians became one of many in our personal news feeds, appearing next to those shared by friends, family members and acquaintances. Using the terminology of social sciences, we focus more on agency than structure. In other words, the media and the public are more interested in those who act, the decision-makers, rather than in the social context of their actions. Nevertheless, it is important to consider both the context and the structure in order to understand the deep-lying arrangements influencing the opportunities, resources, and interpretations connected with decision-making. One such structural element is the social capital in a given society or a subgroup.

According to a prominent French philosopher Pierre Bourdieu, social capital can be defined as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (Bourdieu, 2011). Therefore, the relationship between individuals can help one to accumulate human capital (Machalek & Martin, 2015). According to Bourdieu’s concept, the various forms of capital can be interchanged, hence gathering social capital can bolster financial or political capital as well. The latter dimension is more interesting for us, as this research report focuses on the political aspects of social capital. One of the most important works on those aspects is Rober Putnam’s *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000). In his book, Putnam follows the decline of social capital in the United States. According to his concept,

this decline has significant effects on civic engagement and civil society, as well as citizens' voluntary associations in general, which, since Tocqueville, were deemed schools of democracy. It is no wonder that the essentially liberal theories of system transformation in communist states of East and Central Europe stressed the importance of civil society.

An important strategic innovation of Polish dissidents was the idea to build parallel structures beyond the official, communist state. According to the concept of New Evolutionism, the strategy was directed to the present, the goal was to 'build a framework for democratic socialism', which was not necessarily an institutionalised, legal structure, but an everyday community, set of interactions among people. Such a community could be elaborated through acts of 'defiance' (Michnik, 1985). A similar strategy had been developed by dissidents in Czechoslovakia. However, it was not an alternative union with massive membership, but the cultural underground that was the bearer of the parallel society. In East Germany, alternative groups with an environmentalist, pacifist agenda used the organisational infrastructure of the Lutheran church. These political activities required dense interpersonal networks, or in other words, a high social capital. The Hungarian society, on the other hand, was more individualised and demobilised. As the communist dictator, János Kádár put it: 'who is not against us, is with us.' Due to this deliberative demobilisation and the higher living standards compared to the other countries of the communist bloc, people pursued their individual life strategies instead of looking for collective solutions. Consequently, despite a lesser level of oppression, narrower intellectual groups have been active in dissident political activism.

When it comes to the current political situation in Hungary and Poland, it is obvious that high social capital is required to counter illiberalism and right-wing populism. It is no wonder that the illiberal regimes are attacking civil society organisations and avoiding real social consultation. Nevertheless, illiberal, right-wing populist regimes are not without social support. The Fidesz and PiS politicians also rely on citizens' engagement and they are mobilising their supporters via the above-mentioned dense networks. On the other side, civil society associations are not necessarily inclusive or promote democratic skills. These have been labelled as 'uncivil society' (Glasius, 2010) or 'bad civil society' (Chambers & Kopstein, 2001). However, the challengers of illiberal regimes should focus on gathering social and human capital. As the last decade has demonstrated, citizens' direct political action alone cannot effectively challenge the illiberal regimes, which have electoral support and legitimacy. On the other hand, opposition parties cannot effectively mobilise voters without social contacts.

Hence, institutionalised and non institutionalised political forces should cooperate in order to stop democratic backsliding in the region. An important prerequisite of it is the accumulation of social capital.

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2

WHAT IS SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND HOW IS IT UNDERSTOOD?

The term ‘social capital’ is a concept that originated as an extension of the term ‘human capital’. Over the past two decades, both the evolution of the concept itself and numerous related concepts have given it an entirely new meaning. Due to its multidimensional, quantitative and qualitative nature, social capital can be understood in many ways, hence the variety of different types of social capital functioning in contemporary theoretical concepts.

Social capital analysis has four main dimensions: structures, norms and values, trust, and actions. Social structures include formal and informal social networks, numerous social groups, and leaders. Among the mentioned key norms, such as cooperation, reciprocity, solidarity, the key issue is trust. Hence interpersonal trust, generalised trust, or trust in institutions were placed in a separate dimension. Actions consist of collective action, cooperation, communication, and education.

Table 1. **Dimensions of social capital**

Trust	Norms and Values	Structures	Actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• general trust• in persons• in the legal system• in institutions (e.g. UE)• in leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• norms of reciprocity and shared responsibility for the common good• solidarity• norms of cooperation• territorial identity	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• relationships• formal and informal• social networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• group activities• participation in civil society• social communication

Source: the authors' own research

The role of trust in the formation of social capital is crucial due to the current socio-political situation:

- 1 The growing political polarisation, which results, among other things, in the sharpening of the media discourse.
- 2 Significant differences in confidence in the European Union between member states, which indicate problems in the area of EU cohesion. While average trust level in the EU is at its highest since the 2008 financial crisis, Eurobarometer surveys show relatively strong Eurosceptic sentiment observed in Central European countries (e.g. Poland) but even higher in France and Germany.
- 3 The COVID-19 pandemic, which creates a bilateral need for trust, both in public authorities (they have to rely on citizens' compliance and must try to promote and maintain their trust to be effective) and in citizens, since they need to feel that somebody can do something, can (has the power to) protect them, to act at the needed collective level.

3


METHODOLOGY

In order to ensure the utmost reliability of the research process, as well as the accuracy of the formulated conclusions and recommendations, we have used a methodological approach based on triangulation, which is one of the foundations of social research. Triangulation will concern the following areas:

- Research methods and techniques (methodological triangulation) – involve controlling the coherence of conclusions formulated using various data collection methods;
- Sources of information (data triangulation) – involves multiplying the sources of information within the same method of collecting them;
- Research perspectives of the people conducting the study (analytical triangulation) – the results of the study are analysed by a team of several people.

Figure 1. **Illustration of triangulation used in the study**

Source: the authors' own work



3.1. The objectives of the study

The essential objectives of the project are:

- 1 To analyse social capital in Poland and Hungary.
- 2 To provide indicators for monitoring the state of social capital in such dimensions as:
 - trust,
 - relations with various reference groups,
 - attitude towards the common good, building a civic society – social activity, civic experience,
 - actions on behalf of others (volunteerism and philanthropy),
 - acceptance of democracy,
 - interest in politics and political activity,
 - civic activism.

3.2. Research methods and techniques


Table 2. **The rationale for the choice of research techniques, including a description of the research sample**

Technique	Rationale	Sample selection and size
Desk research	Desk research was the first stage of the study – the introduction to the research proper. It allowed researchers to familiarise themselves with the context of the study, as well as all the documents relevant to it.	Social capital surveys and publicly available sociological reports were analysed.
FGI (Focus Group Interviews)	<p>Discussions were conducted according to a script prepared in advance, describing the objectives of each research stage (i.e. what information is to be obtained during that stage) and including issues to be raised during a free discussion.</p> <p>The purpose of the discussion was to obtain qualitative material, which would deepen the results of the quantitative research and develop selected issues.</p> <p>NGO representatives, local and other activists took part in the research – such a selection of respondents was justified by the desire to obtain data from people who were more involved in social activity than average citizens.</p> <p>Discussions were recorded in audio and/or video format.</p>	<p>As a part of the study, researchers held:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 focus group interviews with NGO representatives, local and other activists in Poland. • 2 focus group interviews with NGO representatives, local and other activists in Hungary.
CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing)	<p>In research carried out using the CATI method, the interview with the respondent was conducted over the phone, and the questions were written down according to a special computer script. The script allowed the questionnaire to be automated.</p> <p>The aim of the CATI survey was to attempt to measure social capital described according to operationalised research indicators.</p>	<p>1 393 respondents took part in the CATI Internet study:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 779 in Poland • 614 in Hungary <p>According to the representative nature of the sample by gender and age.</p> <p>The CATI questionnaire interview scenario is a separate annex to the report.</p>

Source: the authors' own research


3.3. The structure of the sample

Figure 2. Sex – Poland, N=779




Source: the authors' own research

Figure 3. Sex – Hungary, N=614



Source: the authors' own research


Figure 4. Age – Poland, N=779



Source: the authors' own research


3.3. The structure of the sample *cont.*

Figure 5. Education – Poland, N=779




Source: the authors' own research

Figure 6. Education – Hungary, N=614



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 7. Age – Hungary, N=614




Source: the authors' own research

3.4. The research process and schedule

Figure 8. **Diagram of the research procedure**

Source: the authors' own research




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ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS

4.1. Trust

Figure 9. **General trust**


In general, do you think that



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 10. **Trust in people**


Please tell me if you trust in



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 11. Trust in institutions

Please tell me if you trust in



Source: the authors' own research

Commentary

The results of the surveys on trust vary between the two countries, but the differences are not large. When it comes to general trust in society, both the majority of Hungarian and Polish citizens are cautious towards others – 63% and 76% of respondents, respectively. Only 35% of Hungarians and 21% of Poles believe that people can be trusted. Polish society turns out to be more distrustful in this comparison, although both countries are characterised by a pessimistic attitude. This is related to the lack of authorities, which could be a respectable foundation of trust in times of pandemic:

There are no authorities that could successfully promote behaviour for the common good, for example, convince people to get vaccinated, to wear masks, etc. [f37, district council]

Poles definitely trust their family and friends (as much as 97% of respondents), then neighbours (73% of respondents) and local authorities, although in this case, the result is not unequivocal because only 59% of respondents trust those entities, and 8% were not able to determine their attitude.

I used to rely a lot on other people's trust, but now I find myself losing trust in other people – representatives of the administration, local governments, co-workers [...]. I trust people close to me and co-workers whom I have known for a long time. [m28, director of social cooperative]

It is different among Hungarian respondents, as they put less trust in their immediate environment (by 11 percentage points), their neighbours (by five percentage points) and more in local authorities (by ten percentage points) in comparison to Poland.

Responses to the question about trust in institutions showed that Polish respondents trust the European Union the most (74% of respondents), followed by the police (54%) and courts (50%). They put less trust in the President (46%), the Parliament and the Government (44% each), which does not fulfil its role of authority during a pandemic:

It is difficult to find such a unifying haven that fosters trust [...]. A government that works well should be our mentor, we should be able to trust in what they do, but we're facing an absurd situation. This also strengthens the divide into vaxxers and anti-vaxxers and reinforces other divisions. [m39, city council and NGO]

It should be noted that a large group had problems with choosing an answer – in the case of courts, it was as much as 11% of responders. Poles had difficulty in taking a clear stance toward certain institutions.

On the other hand, the majority of the Hungarian respondents declare trust in the Police (79% of respondents) and Courts (66%). The government, the president, the European Union and the parliament reached lower and comparable values, although this trust may also be superficial:

We pretend to trust in it, at the same time we hope to get the best from the state. As soon as something extraordinary happens, it comes out how much we don't trust it. [m25, NGO]

In conclusion, the Hungarian public is characterised by greater trust in state institutions not directly related to politics but is divided in its assessment of legislative and executive institutions. The greatest difference in the comparison between the two countries is the declared trust in the European Union, as in the case of Poland it is the highest of all institutions surveyed, while in Hungary it is one of the lowest, which was probably related to the chaotic actions during the pandemic:


There was no single clear move by the European Commission on what it was going to accept. [m25, right-wing activist]

In the overall assessment of social trust, it can be concluded that Poles are more distrustful than Hungarians in most of the surveyed sectors. Both countries definitely trust their environment more than institutions related to politics, although there were significant differences in the assessment of trust in the judiciary and police forces.

4.2. Norms and values


Figure 12. Attitudes towards the common good

Which of the following behaviors do you personally care about



Source: the authors' own research


Figure 13. **Sense of national identity**



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 14. **Acceptance of democracy**

Which of the following statements about democracy do you find closest?



Source: the authors' own research

Commentary

More than half of respondents from both countries are concerned about all of the above-mentioned attitudes and behaviours unworthy of a citizen. Poles are most concerned about wrongly collecting unemployment benefits (64%) and paying less tax than one should (62%). Conversely, they care least about avoiding paying for public transport (51%). This differs from the answers of Hungarian respondents, who chose

an irresponsible city councillor and extortionate compensation as most deserving of attention (66% each). They are least concerned about unjust unemployment benefits (53%) and unfair taxes (there is the biggest gap between Polish and Hungarian respondents – as much as 11% difference). Paying for a quicker visit to the doctor results in similar ratings among respondents from both countries (60% of Poles and 58% of Hungarians care about it).

If we push in front of someone who needs a seat more, e.g. in a hospital, we have that person on our conscience. [m45, guerrilla gardening]

In both cases, a small percentage of respondents were unable to answer the questions, but respondents from Poland were more decisive.

The survey on national identity has shown that almost 3/4 of respondents from Poland declare the feeling of a strong connection with their country, while more than 20% partially agree with this statement. It is a larger percentage of the research sample than among the Hungarian respondents because only 11% of them are “undecided” and 85% are sure of a strong attachment to their homeland. In both countries, only three per cent of respondents feel no connection to their country. There is a similar proportion of differences between the countries when it comes to the evaluation of pride in living in a given country, although in the case of Poland the percentage of respondents who definitely agree with this statement is decreasing (62% of Polish vs. 79% of Hungarian respondents), while there are more people who partially (31%) or completely (6%) do not identify themselves with their country (13% and 7% in Hungary, respectively).

More than half of respondents from Hungary and more than 2/3 of respondents from Poland find democracy to be the best form of government, despite some doubts about its implementation in their country:

I feel best in a democratic system. I don't mind losing, only playing unfairly. [f46, local government]

I don't think a better system has been invented yet. It is difficult to say whether Poland is a tyranny of the minority or of the majority, but it seems to me that it is a tyranny of the minority. [f23, youth organization of one of the left-oriented parties]

A significant percentage of Hungarians stated that for them, the form of government does not matter (11% of respondents), an undemocratic system might be better (10%), and democracy is a bad form of government (9%), although that depends directly on people in charge:


A democracy is bad if it has citizens who are not fit to run it. [m18, NGO]

In total, this amounts to 30% of respondents with ambivalent or negative opinions about this form of government. In the case of Poles, the percentage of respondents with such an attitude is half as high. It should be noted that as many as 15% and 17% of the respondents were unable or did not want to answer the question about democracy.

4.3. Structures

Figure 15. **Relations to institutions**


Please tell me that you have ever heard that



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 16. **Relations with people**


Please tell me if you are satisfied from



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 17. **Feeling of security**

Please tell me if you are satisfied from the level of security in the place of residence



Source: the authors' own research

Commentary:

There are problems in relations with institutions in both countries. 51% of Poles have sometimes encountered inefficiency in dealing with official matters, while 28% described such a situation as frequent. This gives a total of 79% of respondents who are aware of the difficulties.

It all depends on the office we go to and how it works. I know it's pretty terrible in the offices, sometimes there are nice, helpful officials, but rarely. It always takes long, it's difficult, etc., and there's no help with filling in documents. The Act on digital accessibility is a dead letter so far, e.g. websites are not adapted according to it. [f40, local NGO]

More than half of the respondents have heard about using contacts or other means to settle or complete official matters (48% of the respondents said that this happens sometimes, 9% that it happens often), although in this case also 40% of the respondents have not experienced this.

When I go to the office to do something, I try to do it without connections, and I'm supposed to be treated like the people before me and behind me. If, as a councillor, I call the office and say that they have sent someone away, then they will treat that person differently, better. Pathologies begin when connections translate into personal benefits. [m39, city council and NGO]

Also more than half of Poles declare that feelings of powerlessness or humiliation in dealings with public institutions happen (42% stated that they have sometimes heard about it, 14% that they have often heard about it). However, a large part of responders has not experienced it (42%).

Hungarian respondents declare even to a greater degree that they have met with difficulties in dealing with official matters.

At the municipal level, there is chaos in regulations. It is slow. Rules are often changed. [m42, left-wing activist]

Only 11% of respondents have never encountered inefficiency in public institutions, and 47% describe it as a situation that occurs often. Also, the vast majority of respondents indicate the need to use connections (altogether, 83% of Hungarian respondents). What is more, to a greater degree than Poles, they have heard about feelings of powerlessness and humiliation (47% – from time to time, and 21% – often), and 30% of respondents have not experienced such a situation.

The vast majority of respondents from both countries are characterised by satisfaction with interpersonal relationships, both with acquaintances and groups of friends (although in Hungary, five per cent fewer respondents declare satisfaction).


Also, the sense of security is higher in Poland (94% of respondents are satisfied with its level) compared to Hungary, among which 13% answered negatively, which is also connected to the threat of coronavirus infection:

Feeling safe means removal of fear [m22, right-wing activist]

4.4. Actions

Figure 18. **Voting in elections**


Did you vote in the last national elections



Source: the authors' own research

Figure 19. **Interest in politics and matters of local affairs**


To what extent are you interested in:



Source: the authors' own research

4.4. **Actions** *cont.*

Figure 20. **Participation in society and charitable activities**



Source: the authors' own research

Commentary:

The vast majority of respondents participated in the last national elections, although a higher percentage of Poles voted (91% of respondents compared to 88% of Hungarians). However, these opinions should be regarded as declarative, which is a typical reaction of respondents who tend to overestimate actual political participation (in Poland in 2019, turnout was just over 60%, while in Hungary this number was 69,73%).

86% of Polish and 83% of Hungarian respondents declared their interest in politics, and even more respondents care about local issues – 95% and 94%, respectively. These values are comparable.

The survey results indicated low social involvement of respondents from both countries, although it is higher in Poland than in Hungary – 23% of Poles have been active in the local community in the last year (and none of the Hungarian respondents). This may be due to both distrust and a lack of stability in their lives.

We have never had a very strong trust in civil society. I don't really see that a large part of society can be activated. There could be many reasons for this, but how to develop it is something that the younger generation can perhaps solve. [m18, NGO]

I feel that the most committed people are those, who have stability at work and in their families, and who want to give something back to society. [f51, district council]

It is probably also related to the pandemic situation, which limits activities and introduces anxiety about one's health and the health of loved ones. A comparable percentage of respondents were present at public meetings (16% of Polish and 18% of Hungarian respondents) and spoke at them (12% of Poles and 10% of Hungarians). Social activity in the form of volunteering is noticeably more common in Hungary – 36% of respondents admitted to such experience compared to 20% of Polish respondents. Interestingly, more than half of the Polish respondents declare that they donated to people in need outside their family (58%), while none of the Hungarian respondents made this kind of charitable gesture last year. It follows that Poles prefer financial help, while Hungarians prefer direct work in the form of volunteering.

5

SUMMARY

Our report describes social capital in Poland and Hungary in terms of four dimensions: 1) Trust, 2) Norms and values, 3) Structure and 4) Action. In this summary, we included the most important similarities and differences in each of these dimensions and a synthetic social capital index presented in the table.

Trust:

- Both countries are characterised by low overall trust in society and similar levels of trust in individuals (although Poles trust their immediate environment more, while Hungarians also trust local authorities).
- Hungarians trust institutions more (more than half of the respondents), and the most trustworthy for them are the police and courts (not directly related to politics); while Poles declare the highest trust in the European Union.
- About half of respondents from both countries trust institutions connected with politics, i.e. the Government, the President and the Parliament.

Norms and values:

- Among selected attitudes unworthy of a citizen, Hungarians are most affected by the irresponsibility of a municipal councillor and by extortionate compensation, while Poles are most affected by the wrongful acceptance of unemployment benefits and tax fraud.
- Poles and Hungarians declare a sense of strong attachment to their countries and are proud to live there.
- Poles are more pro-democracy compared to Hungarians, who are divided in their assessment of the effectiveness of this form of government.

Structures:

- Difficulties in dealing with official matters are common in both countries, although more often experienced by Hungarians; these relate to the ineffectiveness, the need to use connections and a feeling of powerlessness or humiliation.
- Both groups of respondents are characterised by high levels of satisfaction with closer and further interpersonal relationships and a sense of security in their place of residence.

Activities:

- Both Poles and Hungarians declare a high turnout in the last national elections and also a high interest in politics, especially in local activities.
- Both societies are characterised by low prosocial activity. Moreover, they tend to choose different forms of charity – Poles prefer financial aid, while Hungarians prefer direct work in the form of volunteering.

Next, we present the percentage of social capital between 0% and 100% for each indicator, area, dimension and total social capital indicator.

Figure 21. **Social capital in Poland and Hungary - a summary overview**

Source: the authors' own research

	Poland	Hungary
Trust	50%	57%
Trust in general: most people can be trusted	21%	35%
Trust in people	76%	74%
members of your own family (yes)	97%	86%
friends and acquaintances (yes)	73%	68%
neighbours (yes)	59%	69%
Trust in institutions	53%	61%
local authority (local government, i.e. municipality head, mayor, city president and councillors) (yes)	59%	69%
courts (yes)	50%	66%
police (yes)	54%	79%
Parliament (yes)	44%	51%
President (yes)	46%	53%
Government (yes)	44%	55%
European Union (yes)	74%	52%
	Poland	Hungary
Norms and values	65%	63%
Attitudes towards the common good	59%	60%
someone pays less taxes than they should (I care)	62%	55%
someone avoids paying for the use of public transport (I care)	51%	59%
someone gets unemployment benefit wrongly (I care)	64%	53%
someone pays extra to get to a doctor or hospital faster (I care)	60%	58%
the city councillor does not come on duty (I care)	58%	66%
someone is extorting insurance compensation (I care)	58%	66%
A sense of national identity	68%	73%
I feel strongly connected with Poland/Hungary (agree)	74%	85%
I am proud to live in Poland/Hungary (agree)	62%	79%
Acceptance for democracy: democracy has an advantage over all other forms of government	67%	55%

	Poland	Hungary
Structures	70%	71%
Relations with institutions	17%	34%
he / she could not efficiently, quickly and easily settle any official matter (often)	28%	47%
had to look for connections or other means to settle some official matter (often)	9%	34%
he / she felt completely powerless and humiliated when dealing with some official matter (often)	14%	21%
Relationships with people	98%	93%
relations with colleagues / acquaintances (satisfied)	98%	93%
relations with a group of friends (satisfied)	98%	93%
Sense of security: the level of security in the place of residence (satisfied)	94%	86%

	Poland	Hungary
Actions	91%	88%
Declared participation in elections (yes)	91%	88%
Interest in politics and local affairs	91%	89%
politics (I'm interested)	86%	83%
what is happening in the place where I live (I'm interested)	95%	94%

	Poland	Hungary
Social capital	69%	70%
Trust	50%	57%
Norms and values	65%	63%
Structures	70%	71%
Actions	91%	88%

Despite the differences visible in individual indicators and areas, it is evident that both within the four analysed dimensions and the synthetic value of the percentage indicator, the level of social capital is quite similar.

The most important similarities include **low trust in society, difficulties in relations with public administration, a sense of attachment to one's country and interest in local and general politics**. Respondents from both countries, on the other hand, differ primarily in their **level of trust in institutions, sensitivity to various behaviours unworthy of citizens, attitudes towards democracy and various forms of community involvement**. In addition, the pandemic has reduced opportunities for action, highlighted systemic failures and affected feelings of security and stability.

The low social capital in terms of trust can be linked to the high social polarisation visible in Poland and Hungary, which leads to weakened social ties, conflicts and inadequate functioning of public administration. This is a serious challenge for the societies of both countries. Think-tank organisations can play an important role in meeting it: acting horizontally by including representatives of various backgrounds and 'breaking through' the existing information and ideological bubbles, and focusing on proposing solutions in various areas of the functioning of society and the state based on a substantive debate.

6

APPENDIX

6.1. List of tables

Table 1. Dimensions of social capital	8
Table 2. The rationale for the choice of research techniques, including a description of the research sample	12

6.2. List of figures

Figure 1. Illustration of triangulation used in the study	11
Figure 2. Sex – Poland, N=779	13
Figure 3. Sex – Hungary, N=614	13
Figure 4. Age – Poland, N=779	13
Figure 5. Education – Poland, N=779	14
Figure 6. Education – Hungary, N=614	14
Figure 7. Age – Hungary, N=614	14
Figure 8. Diagram of the research procedure	15
Figure 9. General trust	16
Figure 10. Trust in people	16
Figure 11. Trust in institutions	17
Figure 12. Attitudes towards the common good	20
Figure 13. Sense of national identity	21
Figure 14. Acceptance of democracy	21
Figure 15. Relations to institutions	24
Figure 16. Relations with people	24
Figure 17. Feeling of security	25
Figure 18. Voting in elections	27
Figure 19. Interest in politics and matters of local affairs	27
Figure 20. Participation in society and charitable activities	27
Figure 21. Social capital in Poland and Hungary – a summary overview	32

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6.4. Organisations

ENoP – The European Network of Political Foundation serves as an umbrella network and information hub on topics related to democracy and development cooperation. As such, it provides its members a joint platform to engage into a coordinated dialogue with EU institutions, CSOs and other relevant stakeholders.

ENoP brings together 53 political foundations from 23 European countries, active in Europe and with over 130 local offices in partner countries. Although independent in nature, each of the ENoP members is affiliated with one of six political groups represented in the European Parliament (ECR, EPP, Greens/EFA, The Left in the European Parliament, S&D, Renew Europe). This broad spectrum of affiliation reflects the political diversity of the European democratic landscape and gives ENoP a unique approach.

Projekt: Polska are people who are dreaming of a modern, open, and liberal Poland. Those, to whom a democratic, effective and citizen-friendly government is a key goal, and who help accomplish this goal while enjoying themselves, forming new friendships, and furthering their own interests. The Projekt: Polska Foundation is our framework, a group of professionals with immense experience in direct action: entrepreneurs, leading ngo heads, civil servants.



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